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BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 This is an appeal by defendant Jocko King from the 
judgment of the district court in a criminal case following his 
plea of guilty to drug and related firearms charges.  The sole 
issue on appeal is the propriety of the sentence of 480 months on 
Counts 1, 2, 31, and 33 of Indictment No. 93-40-8, to which King 
pled guilty,1 and more particularly the propriety of the district 
court's statement that its decision to depart downward by three 
levels under § 5K1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines 
(for substantial cooperation) was a function of its sentencing 
"practice."  Because the § 5K1.1 departure scheme requires the 
exercise of discretion centering upon the nature and extent of 
cooperation and does not admit of any sentencing "practice," we 
vacate and remand. 
 I. 
 King was one of the leaders of a major cocaine 
conspiracy.  Based upon drug quantity, specific offense 
characteristics, and role in the offense, his adjusted offense 
level for purposes of guidelines sentencing was 48, which was 
reduced to 45 because, as the government conceded, King accepted 
                     
1
.  A concurrent sentence was imposed on No. 92-632-01, the other 
count to which King pled guilty. 
  
responsibility, and hence was entitled to a two- or three-level 
downward adjustment (the court chose three).  King also 
cooperated with the government,2 resulting in a § 5K1.1 
certification which enabled the court to depart downward from the 
guidelines range.  Although the court's discretion to depart 
downward was not constrained by any mechanical formula, but only 
the criteria set forth in § 5K1.1, see infra, and the exercise of 
its discretion, the court handled the matter as follows: 
  Now, my practice, when I grant a § 5K1.1 motion, 
is to go down three levels, three additional levels, on 
the theory if Acceptance of Responsibility is worth 
three levels, Substantial Cooperation should be worth 
the same. 
 
App. at 63 (emphasis added).  This three-level departure reduced 
the guideline level to 42 which, coupled with defendant's 
criminal history score of VI, led to a guidelines range of 360 
months to life.  As noted, the court imposed a sentence of 480 
months.  King submits that the court erred as a matter of law in 
tying its departure to a mechanical rule instead of exercising 
its discretion.  In King's view, this error necessitates vacatur 
of the sentence and remand for reconsideration. 
 King was part of a multiple defendant drug conspiracy 
involving two other leaders and numerous subordinates.  The 
government contends that, whatever the district court may have 
said, its sentencing of the other defendants in this conspiracy 
case demonstrates that it had no mechanical policy of departing 
                     
2
.  Indeed, his cooperation was quite significant, and was 
important in convicting his co-kingpins. 
  
down three levels for substantial cooperation in response to the 
government's § 5K1.1 motions.  It is true that the court did 
depart in quite different degrees with respect to co-defendants 
Keith Ellis, Thomas Jones, Fred McDuffie, Gregory Miller, Charles 
Ranier, William Richardson and Nathaniel Richardson.  It is also 
true that the court delivered a statement of reason for King's 
sentence in which it explained its decision to depart downward 
(only) three levels in response to the § 5K1.1 motion, despite 
defendant's significant cooperation.3  Nevertheless, for the 
                     
3
.  The statement was as follows: 
 
  This will constitute my sentence of 480 months, 
being one-third more than the minimum sentence in the 
applicable guideline range of 360 months to life. 
 
  This range is based upon a total offense level of 
42, a Criminal History of VI, the latter being the 
result of King's prior sentences, noted in the 
presentence report, for a variety of convictions 
detailed in the presentence report. 
 
  Based on the life history detailed in the 
presentence report, King is manifestly a defendant 
without the slightest concern for the value of human 
life.  At the age of 15, he apparently considered it 
something of a sport to go to the roof of a house and 
start firing indiscriminately, ultimately shooting 
Hilda Young in the back, causing her death.  He also 
thought nothing five years later of punching his wife 
so hard that she dropped one of his many children to 
the floor.  Besides injuring the head and body of the 
infant, he beat up the mother of the child until she 
lost consciousness.  It also has not escaped our 
attention that the quantity of cocaine base for which 
King was responsible exceeded the maximum limit in § 
2D1.1 by a factor of 15.6. 
 
  The only way to protect society from this man is 
to be sure that he spends most of the rest of his life 
in custody.  It is, in fact, difficult to imagine who 
else would qualify as more deserving of the maximum 
  
reasons that follow, we do not believe that these factors are 
sufficient to obviate the necessity of resentencing. 
 II. 
 The language of § 5K1.1 directs a sentencing court to 
gauge the extent and quality of the defendant's cooperation in 
deciding how many levels to depart downward in exchange for this 
cooperation.  Section 5K1.1 provides: 
 (a)  The appropriate reduction shall be 
determined by the court for reasons stated 
that may include, but are not limited to, 
consideration of the following: 
 
  (1)  the court's evaluation of the 
significance and usefulness of the 
defendant's assistance, taking into 
consideration the government's 
evaluation of the assistance 
rendered; 
 
  (2)  the truthfulness, 
completeness, and reliability of 
any information or testimony 
provided by the defendant; 
 
  (3)  the nature and extent of the 
defendant's assistance; 
 
  (4)  any injury suffered, or any 
danger or risk of injury to the 
(..continued) 
penalty than this man who presided over the 
distribution of upwards of 7.5 million vials of crack 
cocaine over a period of at least six years, enough to 
supply each citizen of Philadelphia with five vials.  
But for the Government's twelfth-hour motion under 
U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, the sentence would have been at the 
maximum.   
 
  Under the circumstances, however, I have no 
hesitation in imposing a sentence ten years longer than 
the minimum in the offense level I have applied.   
 
Order of Nov. 10, 1993 at 1-2 (footnote omitted). 
  
defendant or his family resulting 
from his assistance; 
 
  (5)  the timeliness of the 
defendant's assistance. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 (emphasis added).   
 The Background Commentary to this provision under the 
Application Note underscores the section's intent that sentencing 
judges determine the appropriate departure by considering the 
nature of each defendant's cooperation.  The Application Note 
explains: 
 A defendant's assistance to authorities in 
the investigation of criminal activities has 
been recognized in practice and by statute as 
a mitigating sentencing factor.  The nature, 
extent, and significance of assistance can 
involve a broad spectrum of conduct that must 
be evaluated by the court on an individual 
basis.   
 
Application Note to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 (emphasis added).  A proper 
exercise of the district court's discretion under § 5K1.1, 
therefore, involves an individualized qualitative examination of 
the incidents of the defendant's cooperation, and would not seem 
to admit of the use of sentencing "practices." 
 The sentencing jurisprudence also disapproves of 
sentencing "practices" in favor of case-by-case consideration.  
In United States v. Thompson, 483 F.2d 527 (3d Cir. 1973), for 
example, we made it clear that it was unacceptable for a district 
judge to sentence on the basis of a personal "sentencing policy."  
And in United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990), 
we prescribed an approach to departures which required the 
  
sentencing court to consider a number of factors before deciding 
to depart to a specific degree, again a non-mechanical process.  
Corroborating this view is United States v. Johnson, 33 F.3d 8 
(5th Cir. 1994), where Chief Judge Politz explained: 
 The court is charged with conducting a 
judicial inquiry into each individual case 
before independently determining the 
propriety and extent of any departure in the 
imposition of sentence.  While giving 
appropriate weight to the government's 
assessment and recommendation, the court must 
consider all other factors relevant to this 
inquiry.   
 
Id. at 10 (footnote omitted).  We agree.  In Johnson, the court 
vacated and remanded for resentencing in order to insure that 
discretion was exercised. 
 III. 
 As we have noted, the able district judge in this case 
provided a detailed rationale for its sentence, see supra n.3, 
rescribing the court's statement.  However, that statement does 
not, as required by § 5K1.1, analyze the cooperation itself, as 
opposed to the crime or the defendant.  Moreover, the otherwise 
detailed statement of reasons was delivered, by its own terms,  
only to explain why the court sentenced defendant above the 
minimum of the applicable guideline range of 360 months to life, 
not to explain why the court chose the three-level adjustment.   
 We acknowledge that the district court did not follow 
any "practice" in sentencing the co-defendants, but we cannot 
simply assume that it was not doing so here or that it was in 
fact exercising discretion in deciding to depart downwards by 
  
three levels in response to the § 5K1.1 motion.  Rather, we think 
we must take the court at its own word; for this defendant at 
least, it was apparently following some "practice." 
 In sum, because both the language of the provision and 
the guideline case law clearly proscribe these sentencing 
"practices" and instead mandate individualized, case-by-case 
consideration of the extent and quality of a defendant's 
cooperation in making downward departures under § 5K1.1, we 
conclude that the district court erred as a matter of law in 
what, at least on the face of the record, appears to have been a 
mechanical application of the guidelines to this one defendant in 
the conspiracy.4  The judgment will therefore be vacated and the 
case remanded for resentencing consistent with this opinion.  We 
intimate no view as to how the district court should exercise its 
discretion as to the § 5K1.1 departure on remand. 
 _____________________ 
 
                     
4
.  We thus have appellate jurisdiction.  18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1). 
